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THE PERMISSIBLE NORM OF TRUTH 
AND “OUGHT IMPLIES CAN” 
Xintong WEI 
 
ABSTRACT: Many philosophers hold that a norm of truth governs the propositional 
attitude of belief. According to one popular construal of normativity, normativity is 
prescriptive in nature. The prescriptive norm can be formulated either in terms of 
obligation or permission: one ought to or may believe that p just in case p is true. It has 
been argued that the obligation norm is jointly incompatible with the maxim ought 
implies can and the assumption that there exists some truth that we cannot believe. The 
problem of the incompatible triad has motivated some to adopt the permissible norm of 
truth. I argue that the permissible norm faces an analogous problem of the incompatible 
triad.  
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1. Introduction 
Most philosophers hold that there is a standard of correctness for belief: a belief 
that p is correct if and only if p is true. Belief is subject to the norm of truth. 
Philosophers disagree, however, about whether the norm of truth is genuinely 
normative and whether belief is essentially subject to the norm of truth. According 
to one popular construal, normativity is prescriptive in nature, i.e., a prescriptive 
norm is essentially capable of guiding and it issues requirements, permissions or 
prohibitions. Genuine norms tell one what one ought (not) to do under given 
circumstances.1 
Assuming the prescriptive construal of normativity, there are two intuitive 
ways to formulate the norm of truth governing the attitude of believing: 
(𝒯𝑂) For any S, p: S ought to believe that p if and only if p is true.  
(𝒯𝑃) For any S, p: S may believe that p if and only if p is true. 
                                                        
1 The prescriptive construal of the truth norm is widely endorsed, for discussion of alternative 
construal in evaluative and teleological terms, see, Conor McHugh and Daniel Whiting, "The 
Normativity of Belief," Analysis 74, 4 (2014). 
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One problem with 𝒯𝑂 is that we cannot believe every truth that is out there 
in the world, as such, 𝒯𝑂 clashes with the principle ought implies can (OIC). In 
other words, 𝒯𝑂, OIC and the claim that there are cases where if p is true S cannot 
believe that p are jointly incompatible. Call this the problem of the incompatible 
triad.  
The problem of the incompatible triad has motivated normativists to either 
revise 𝒯𝑂 or adopt 𝒯𝑃.2 In this paper, I will focus on the second strategy as 
developed by Daniel Whiting. I will first present the problem of the incompatible 
triad and show how it motivates Whiting’s permissible norm 𝒯𝑃. I then show that 
𝒯𝑃 faces an analogous version of the incompatible triad. I will conclude by briefly 
considering the implication of the result in the debate concerning the truth norm 
of belief. 
2. The Problem of the Incompatible Triad  
According to Whiting,3 the prescriptive formulation of the truth norm 𝒯𝑂 seems 
too demanding, given that we are ordinary epistemic agents with finite cognitive 
powers. Since there are infinitely many truths in the world, and S cannot, surely, 
believe every single one of them, 𝒯𝑂, therefore, faces the following incompatible 
triad: 
(𝒯𝑂) For any S, p: S ought to believe that p if and only if p is true. 
(OIC) For any S, : Necessarily, if S ought to  then S can . 
(Limited Capacity (LC)) There are cases where if p is true, S cannot believe that 
p.4 
                                                        
2 For instance, Paul Boghossian proposes a weaker version of 𝒯𝑂 by dropping the biconditional—
for any S, p: S ought to believe that p only if p is true, in his "The normativity of content," 
Philosophical Issues 13, 1 (2003): 37. Ralph Wedgwood suggests that 𝒯𝑂 should be restricted to 
propositions that one considers in his "Doxastic Correctness," Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume 87, 1 (2013); "The Right Thing to Believe," in The Aim of Belief, ed. Timothy Chan 
(Oxford University Press, 2013). 
3 Daniel Whiting, "Should I Believe the Truth?" Dialectica 64, 2 (2010):213-224. 
4 According to doxastic involuntarism, belief-formation is not under our voluntary control. But 
given OIC, 𝒯𝑂 implies that we have voluntary control over our belief-formation. Therefore, OIC, 
doxastic involuntarism, and 𝒯𝑂 also seem jointly incompatible. For the classic discussion on 
doxastic involuntarism, see William P. Alston, "The deontological conception of epistemic 
justification," Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988). I assume that some form of doxastic 
voluntarism is correct. 
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Motivated by the problem of the incompatible triad, Whiting contends that 
we should reject 𝒯𝑂 and instead adopt 𝒯𝑃. After all, by weakening the deontic 
requirement from an obligation to a permission, we avoid the triad. 𝒯𝑃 is 
compatible with OIC and LC, since 𝒯𝑃 does not say anything about what one ought 
to believe. There is no relevantly parallel principle of “may implies can,” by which 
we could derive a statement about what one can believe under𝒯𝑃. Adopting 
𝒯𝑃 therefore solves the original problem of the incompatible triad.  
3. Does ?⃡?  𝐏 Escape the Incompatible Triad? 
Upon a closer inspection, however, 𝒯𝑃 faces an analogous problem. To see this, I 
will first show that the permission norm implies a falsity norm and, second, 
identify a corresponding claim of Limited Capacity* (LC*) that is incompatible with 
the falsity norm and OIC.  
To facilitate our discussion, I shall follow the notations in standard deontic 
logic (SDL).5 “Ought” is understood in terms of the propositional operator OB (It is 
obligatory that…). According to SDL, OB is a modal operator and the deontic 
formulas are evaluated with respect to sets of worlds, in which some are ideal. For 
our purpose, I adopt the standard semantics for deontic operators, which appeals to 
possible worlds semantics in which all worlds are ranked—some worlds are better 
than others. I will leave it to the reader to decide how to best construe ideality 
with the background theory they prefer (nothing in particular will hinge on this 
here).6 The dual concept of “ought,” i.e. “may,” is abbreviated using the operator 
PE. As is common, the modal operator PE is defined in terms of OB:  
PE x =def ¬OB¬x. 
It is not difficult to show that 𝒯𝑃 entails a falsity norm. 𝒯𝑃 can be broken into 
two conditionals: 
(𝒯  𝑃) For any S, p: p is true  PE (S believes that p) 
(?⃡? 𝑃) For any S, p: PE (S believes that p)  p is true 
Using contraposition, ?⃡? 𝑃 is equivalent to:  
                                                        
5 See, Paul McNamara, "Deontic logic," in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Ed Zalta 
(2010), <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic/>. 
6 The standard semantics is defended by pioneering deontic logicians such as, Lennart Åqvist, 
"Interpretations of Deontic Logic," 73, 290 (1964); David K. Lewis, Counterfactuals (Blackwell, 
1973). More recently, it is also defended by Ralph Wedgwood, The Nature of Normativity, vol. 2 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), chapter 5. 
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For any S, p: p is false  ¬PE (S believes that p)  
Hence, given that PE x =def ¬OB¬x, ?⃡? 𝑃 is equivalent to the following falsity norm: 
(ℱ 𝑂) For any S, p: p is false  OB (¬ S believes that p) 
In other words, 𝒯𝑃 entails that for any S, p, if p is false then S ought not to 
believe that p. Whiting is aware that 𝒯𝑃 entails the obligation norm ℱ 𝑂, after all, 
obligation and permission are dual deontic concepts. He regards this as a welcome 
result because it offers a response to the criticism that 𝒯𝑃 is not normatively 
interesting.7 According to Whiting, 𝒯𝑃 is normatively interesting just because it is 
capable of guiding our belief-formation through ℱ 𝑂, which tells us that we ought 
to refrain from believing p when p is false. Moreover, on Whiting’s view, ℱ 𝑂 
captures a more fundamental aim of belief, namely, to avoid falsity.  
However, given OIC, ℱ 𝑂 implies that we can refrain from believing 
whatever that is false. There is the analogue of the incompatible triad for 𝒯𝑃, since 
ℱ 𝑂 and OIC are jointly incompatible with the following claim: 
(LC*) There are cases where if p is false, S cannot refrain from believing that p. 
Whiting quickly dismisses the problem by rejecting (LC*). He considers a 
case where someone is said to be psychologically unable to refrain from believing 
that there are aliens. Suppose that there are no aliens. Does example like this show 
that LC* is true? Whiting thinks not. First, he complains that the relevant modality 
of “can” figured in OIC is weaker than psychological possibility. He suggests that 
ought to  implies that it is humanly possible to . Second, he argues that critics of 
𝒯𝑃 have not shown there are cases where if p is false, it is humanly impossible to 
refrain from believing that p. Finally, he claims that even if the critic of 𝒯𝑃 can 
show that there are such cases, there is a further question whether the attitude S 
has towards p counts as a genuine belief.  
The question regarding the modality of “can” is indeed an important one. 
However, Whiting’s suggestion that the “can ” figured in OIC should be 
understood as “humanly possible” to  seems ill-motivated and lacks reference to 
the relevant literature on OIC. According to the standard interpretation of “can ,” 
one can  just in case one (1) has the ability to  and (2) has the opportunity to 
exercise that ability to .8 On one influential view, one has an opportunity to  if 
                                                        
7 See, for instance, Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss, "Against Belief Normativity," in The Aim of 
Belief, ed. Timothy Chan (Oxford University Press, 2013). See also Krister Bykvist and Anandi 
Hattiangadi, "Does Thought Imply Ought?," Analysis 67, 296 (2007). 
8 Such formulation is widely adopted in the debate concerning OIC. See, for instance, David 
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there is a non-zero objective chance to  assigned by the relevant psychological 
laws, where psychological laws are laws that are broadly based on folk-psychology 
and deal with agent’s actions and attitudes.9 
On this common interpretation of “can ” as having the ability and 
opportunity to , given the psychological laws governing agent’s actions and 
attitudes, we have at least some reasonably good grasp of what “can ” amounts to, 
broadly based on folk-psychology. By contrast, Whiting does not explain his 
notion of “humanly possible” to . On the face of it, whether it is “humanly 
possible” to  would depend on the kind of creature we are, empirically speaking. 
If that’s right, a natural way to flesh out what is “humanly possible” to  is just the 
standard interpretation of can . It is humanly possible for S to  just in case S has 
the ability and opportunity to , given the psychological laws governing agent’s 
actions and attitudes.  
That being said, I agree with Whiting that critics of 𝒯𝑃 are yet to show that 
LC* is true. The case Whiting offers on behalf of his critics—that of a person who 
cannot refrain from believing that there are aliens does not lend much support to 
LC* because it is hardly convincing that, in so far as how the case is described, that 
the person genuinely cannot refrain from believing that there are aliens. I now 
turn to the task of offering three more persuasive cases in support of LC*.  
First, some beliefs might be deeply integrated in our psychological make-up 
that we cannot refrain from having them. Consider forms of clinical delusions, e.g. 
patients with Capgras delusion cannot refrain from believing that a close relative 
has been replaced by an impostor, often due to cognitive failure including 
abnormal perceptual experiences (as a result of a malfunctioning face recognition 
system) and possibly also with a deficit in their belief evaluation system.10 Now, of 
course, few of us suffer from clinical delusions, yet I think some of our core beliefs 
may be psychologically impossible to shake off in a rather similar way as a result of 
how we are hard-wired to perceive the world. In fact, many philosophical theories, 
if correct, would render some of our core beliefs false. For instance, if error 
theories about mathematics and ethics are correct, none of our mathematical and 
                                                                                                                      
Copp, "'Ought' Implies 'Can' and the Derivation of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," 
Analysis 68, 297 (2008): 67 fn2; P. A. Graham, "'Ought' and Ability," Philosophical Review 120, 3 
(2011); Moti Mizrahi, "Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ from an Epistemic Point of View?," Philosophia 
40, 4 (2012); Moti Mizrahi, "‘Ought’ Does Not Imply ‘Can’," Philosophical Frontiers 4, 1 (2009); 
Peter B. M. Vranas, "I Ought, Therefore I Can," Philosophical Studies 136, 2 (2007); Ralph 
Wedgwood, "Rational 'Ought' Implies 'Can'," Philosophical Issues 23, 1 (2013). 
9 See Wedgwood, "Rational 'Ought' Implies 'Can'," 87. 
10 For a recent overview of neuropsychological accounts of delusions, see Lisa Bortolotti, 
Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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ethical beliefs are literally true.11 If the B-theory of time is correct, then the 
passage of time is an illusion and the present is not ontologically privileged.12 And 
yet, arguably, we cannot refrain from having beliefs about temporal experiences, 
that 2+2=4, or that murder is wrong.  
Second, it is not always within our power to avoid falsity if all evidence 
available to our epistemic community supports the false belief in question. For 
example, we might say that the best evidence available to the ancient Greek 
supports the claim that Phosphorus and Hesperus are two different celestial bodies. 
Given the restricted epistemic circumstances back then, arguably one cannot revise 
the false belief that Phosphorus and Hesperus are two celestial bodies. Similarly, 
some of our current scientific beliefs may turn out false, yet we may not be able to 
revise them if they are supported by what our best evidence suggests. Of course, 
given the development of science and technology, more evidence will become 
available and we will be able to spot more falsehoods and revise our beliefs 
accordingly. Indeed, this is the story of our scientific progress. However, for any 
given period of time, our epistemic position is always limited and we cannot revise 
our false beliefs if they are supported by the best evidence available at the time. 
Third, some propositions are deeply integrated in our epistemic life, such as 
the so-called cornerstone propositions. We cannot refrain from accepting them 
despite the possibility that they are false.13 If I were a brain in a vat, then those 
cornerstone propositions would be false. Yet, can I genuinely refrain from 
believing those cornerstone propositions? Perhaps in an epistemology seminar I 
can momentarily refrain from believing cornerstone propositions while 
entertaining the sceptical scenarios. However, it is hard to imagine that we can 
carry on refraining from believing cornerstone propositions if we were to live a 
normal epistemic life, since if I did not believe that I am not a brain in vat, I would 
not be able to have the ordinary empirical beliefs which are crucial for me to 
navigate through the world. Of course, the point here is not to claim that 
scepticism is true. Rather, the point is to emphasize that there are some 
propositions at the core of our belief system that we cannot refrain from believing, 
given the kind of creatures we are. As such, if scepticism were true, we would not 
                                                        
11 See, notably, Hartry Field, Realism, Mathematics & Modality (Blackwell, 1989); John L. 
Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Penguin Books, 1977). 
12 For an influential account of B-theory of time, see, for instance, Theodore Sider, Four 
Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time, vol. 3 (Oxford University Press, 2001). 
13 The concept of cornerstone proposition is first coined in Crispin Wright, "Warrant for Nothing 
(and Foundations for Free)?," 78, 1 (2004), which is inspired by Wittgenstein’s idea of hinge 
proposition in his On Certainty, eds. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (Harper 
Torchbooks, 1969). My use of cornerstone proposition simplifies the details of Wright’s account.  
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be able to refrain from believing false cornerstone propositions and hence LC* is 
true. 
In short, the underlying thought is this: given the psychological and 
cognitive constraints, and the fact that the world is not always cooperative, we 
cannot avoid all falsity. “Seek all truths” and “avoid all falsity” are really two sides 
of the same coin. If we think the former clashes with OIC, there is prima facie 
reason to think the same applies to the latter, given that we are finite epistemic 
agents. Hence 𝒯𝑃 faces an analogue of the incompatible triad, and so in that respect 
does not fare any better than the obligation norm which it aims to replace. 
Now you might point out that Whiting could still maintain that even if we 
have shown that LC* is true, there is a further question as to whether the attitude 
in question is in fact a belief. Whiting might insist that if the above three kinds of 
cases are cases where a subject cannot but have a belief-like attitude towards the 
propositions in question, then that attitude is not that of belief. Suppose that I 
cannot refrain from believing, say, that 2+2=4, even in the presence of 
overwhelming evidence that mathematical fictionalism is true, then, it may be 
argued that my attitude towards the proposition 2+2=4 is not that of belief. 
I do not see how Whiting can maintain this point without presupposing a 
normative account of belief—the very claim that is at issue in the debate. On a 
normative account of belief, belief is essentially governed by the truth norm, as 
such, an attitude that is insensitive to evidence and fails to be revised according to 
the truth norm cannot count as belief. However, to assume this normative account 
of belief is to beg the question against the critics of the truth norm, who are likely 
to deny that belief is essentially governed by the truth norm. Without 
presupposing a normative account of belief, it is hard to see why my attitude 
towards that 2+2=4 fails to be a belief, as long as the attitude plays the kind of 
functional role belief plays in one’s mental economy. 
5. Conclusion  
If the case for LC* is successful, then the problem of the incompatible triad poses a 
challenge not only for 𝒯𝑂, but for 𝒯𝑃 and ℱ 𝑂 as well. In so far as one endorses the 
principle OIC, one cannot avoid the triad by weakening the deontic requirement 
from an obligation to a permission. Neither can one avoid the triad by adopting an 
obligatory norm of avoiding falsity.  
It is also worth pointing out that Wedgwood’s version of 𝒯𝑂 would not 
escape the triad either. On Wedgwood’s account, one ought to believe a true 
proposition if one considers that proposition, which is compatible with OIC and 
LC since the revised truth norm does not require one to believe the infinite many 
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truths out there that one never ever entertains. Now, if I am right about LC*, then 
Wedgewood’s version of 𝒯𝑂 does not escape the problem of the triad because it is 
incompatible with OIC and LC*. Why? Presumably, in virtue of having an 
occurrent belief that p, one does consider the proposition involved in that belief. 
So, if the proposition is in fact false, then on Wedgwood’s account, one ought to 
revise that belief, which may be something one cannot do given that for some p, 
one cannot but believe that p.  
The normativists’ hands are therefore tight. There remain two options. The 
normativist may appeal to a different construal of normativity that is not 
necessarily prescriptive in nature. For instance, many have developed an evaluative 
account of the truth norm.14 The idea, roughly, is that it is good or ideal to have 
true beliefs, even if one cannot always believe the truth. The evaluative construal 
of 𝒯𝑂  can avoid the original incompatible triad since it does not issue any 
requirement. Alternatively, the normativist could simply reject OIC. Numerous 
authors have recently challenged OIC in light of empirical evidence and 
counterexamples, independently of the problem that concerns us here.15 However, 
neither option is available to Whiting. If he wants to maintain the original 
motivation for adopting 𝒯𝑃, as based on its role in resolving the original 
incompatible triad, he is ipso facto committed to both the prescriptive construal of 
normativity and the truth of OIC.16 
                                                        
14 For evaluative construal of the truth norm see, for instance, William P. Alston, "Concepts of 
Epistemic Justification," The Monist 68, 2 (1985); Matthew Chrisman, "Ought to Believe," 
Journal of Philosophy 105, 7 (2008); Davide Fassio, "Belief, Correctness and Normativity," 
Logique Et Analyse 54, 216 (2011); Conor McHugh, "The Truth Norm of Belief," Pacific 
Philosophical Quarterly 93, 1 (2012); Conor McHugh, "Fitting Belief," Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 114, 2 (2014). 
15 For recent arguments against OIC, see Graham, "'Ought' and Ability;" Mizrahi, "‘Ought’ Does 
Not Imply ‘Can’;" "Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ from an Epistemic Point of View?;" Paul Henne et 
al., "An Empirical Refutation of ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’," Analysis 76, 3 (2016). 
16 Acknowledgment: I am particularly grateful to Philip Ebert and Krister Bykvist for their 
extremely thoughtful and invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like 
to thank the audience of the 6th Stockholm Graduate Conference where the paper was presented 
for their helpful questions and suggestions. This work was supported by the John Templeton 
Foundation under Grant 58450. 
